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To live in Harlem is to dwell in the very bowels of the city; it is to pass a 
labyrinthine existence among streets that explode monotonously skyward with the 
spires and crosses of churches and clutter under foot with garbage and decay.   
Harlem is a ruin−many of its ordinary aspects (its crimes, its casual violence, its 
crumbling buildings with littered areaways, ill-smelling halls and vermin infested 
rooms) are indistinguishable from the distorted images that appear in dreams, and 
which, like muggers in a lonely hall, quiver in the waking mind with hidden and 
threatening significance.  Yet this is no dream but the reality of well over four 
hundred thousand Americans; a reality which for many defines and colors the 
world.  Overcrowded and exploited politically and economically, Harlem is the 
scene and symbol of the Negro’s perpetual alienation in the land of their birth.  
 
…this is a world in which the major energy of the imagination goes not into 
creating works of art, but to overcome the frustrations of social discrimination.  Not 
quite citizens and yet Americans, full of the tensions of modern man but regarded 
as primitives, Negro Americans are in desperate search of an identity. Rejecting the 
second-class status assigned to them, they feel alienated and search for answers to 
the questions: Who am I, Where am I, and Why?  Significantly, in Harlem the reply 





This essay is intended to describe a perspective on poverty traps in which 
persistence in economic status is generated by group-level influences on individuals. 
What distinguishes this theory from other explanations of poverty is its emphasis on the 
role of social, as opposed to individual-level characteristics.  One way to see this contrast 
is in the context of models of intergenerational mobility. One body of research, due to 
Becker and Tomes (1979) and Loury (1981) explains persistence in relative economic 
status across generations via the effects of parental income on offspring education.  In 
these models, parents directly invest in their children’s education, the level of which 
determines (along with random factors such as luck) the income of the next generation.  
In such models, inequality is persistent across generations because lower income parents 
                                                 
1From “Harlem is Nowhere,” unpublished essay, reprinted in Ellison (1995); quotations 
take from pp. 295-297.   2 
invest less in education than their higher income counterparts.  In contrast, models such 
as Bénabou (1993,1996), Durlauf (1996a,b), Fernandez and Rogerson (1997) consider the 
effects of residential neighborhood on education. In these models, a child’s education is 
determined, at least in part, through factors such as school quality and by characteristics 
of others in the neighborhood in which he grows up.  These interactions mean that 
relative economic status persists across generations when economic segregation exists.  
Poor families live in poor neighborhoods, which depress the future economic prospects of 
their offspring. Of course, individual and group level characteristics are themselves 
interdependent. Parental income influences this because it determines what neighborhood 
a child lives in.  Nevertheless, individual and group level explanations of poverty have 
different implications both in terms of understanding the sources of poverty and 
inequality as well as in terms of the design of public policies. 
Outside the confines of academia, the recognition that social factors play a 
fundamental role in the perpetuation of poverty is a very standard idea.  Ralph Ellison is 
hardly unique in recognizing how space and community influence individual perceptions, 
aspirations and opportunities.  The fact that this perspective has only recently become a 
key feature of economic reasoning should not be attributed to the insularity of economic 
reasoning but rather to the success of individual-based models of economic inequality, 
e.g. models that focus on human capital formation, to elucidate many aspects of income 
inequality.  At the same time, the apparent imperviousness of poverty in places such as 
inner cities has provided the context in which this new perspective has developed.
2 
In previous work, Durlauf (1999,2001), I have described this perspective as the 
“memberships theory” of inequality and poverty since the compositions and behaviors of 
the groups of which a person is a member play such an important role in socioeconomic 
outcomes. As the neighborhood example illustrates, dynamic versions of these models 
(i.e. where the distribution of behaviors and outcomes at one point in time affects future 
distributions of behaviors and outcomes) can explain substantial immobility in economic 
status across generations.  Formally speaking, poverty traps are the limits of such cases of 
economic immobility as poverty traps are nothing more than socioeconomic 
environments in which persistence in economic status is arbitrarily long.  Hence any set 
of theories that explains persistent inequality would seem plausible candidates for 
understanding poverty traps.  That being said, the memberships theory possesses features 
in which the limiting case of a poverty trap seems particularly natural.  Why this is so and 
what implications the memberships theory perspective on poverty traps has for public 
policy are the subjects of my discussion. 
This essay is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the memberships theory 
of poverty and relates it to the specific question of poverty traps.  The role of social 
factors in individual outcomes, the idea that lies at the heart of the memberships theory, is 
expanded upon. The relationship between the theory and persistent racial inequality is 
also addressed.  Section 3 discusses evidence in support of the memberships theory.  This 
evidence is organized into three types: studies from history and social psychology that 
                                                 
2As argued in Manski (2000), another reason this perspective has blossomed is the 
development of mathematical tools that allow for formal modeling of the substantive 
ideas at its foundations. See Blume and Durlauf (2001) for a discussion of some of these 
technical advances.   3 
demonstrate the importance of the social factors on which the memberships theory is 
based, ethnographic studies, and formal statistical analyses.  I also identify some 
important recent advances in empirical work that should prove to be important in 
assessing the theory. Section 4 considers the implications of a memberships perspective 
on poverty traps for policy evaluation.  This section characterizes the sorts of antipoverty 
policies the theory seems to suggest and also considers how data analysis for policy 
evaluation should be conducted in this context. Section 5 provides conclusions. 
 
 




At an abstract level, the memberships theory of inequality is nothing more than an 
approach to understanding socioeconomic outcomes that focuses on the way in which 
various socioeconomic groupings affect individuals.  Individuals, of course, can be 
categorized by any number of groupings.  The basis of the memberships theory is that at 
least some of these memberships have powerful influences on individual outcomes. 
In addition to a common perspective on the causal determinants of poverty and 
inequality, the various analyses that fall under the memberships theory embody new ways 
of understanding individual behavior. Many of these analyses explicitly attempt to 
integrate the richness of sociological and psychological perspectives with the formal 
logic and rigor of economics. To be clear, this work does not deviate from the underlying 
logic of neoclassical economic reasoning.  In memberships models, agents make 
purposeful decisions based on their preferences, their beliefs about the consequences of 
alternative actions, and constraints that delimit those actions. What the memberships 
theory does is explore how groups influence preferences, beliefs, and constraints.  Blume 
and Durlauf (2001) argue that the formal theory underlying these models has important 
implications for the integration of the different disciplines of social science into a unified 
framework. 
As human beings can be categorized in an unlimited number of ways, an 
important issue in memberships models is the choice of what groups on which to focus. 
One would not want to argue that the fact that individuals can be identified into distinct 
grouping by eye color has the same socioeconomic importance as racial groups in 
understanding inequality. Two forms of groups have received particular attention:   
residential neighborhoods (Bénabou (1993,1996), Durlauf (1996a,b), Fernandez and 
Rogerson (1997), Hoff and Sen (2000), Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996)) and 
race (Loury (1977)
3, Lundberg and Startz (1998)).  On the other hand, many of the 
models of group effects (eg. Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b)) have been developed at a 
sufficiently abstract level that they can be applied to any group whose interaction 
structure coincides with the social network structure of the environments under study.  
In thinking about groups, it is useful to differentiate between those groups whose 
memberships are exogenously determined with respect to the phenomenon under study as 
                                                 
3Loury (1977) is remarkable in its attention to issues that reemerged well over fifteen 
years later in the new memberships models.    4 
opposed to those groups whose memberships are endogenously determined. For example, 
among the important sources of membership effects are gender and ethnic groups. Yet for 
purposes of understanding these effects, one naturally treats the memberships of these 
groups as fixed, i.e. exogenous.  In contrast, individuals are strongly influenced by groups 
such as the residential neighborhood in which he grows up, the schools he attends and 
even the coworkers at his various jobs; in each of these cases the members of these 
groups are determined as part of the general processes that characterize the evolution of 
the economy and society. Such groups are best thought of as endogenous.  One can even 
see how the effects that groups generate on their membership may, in the case of 
endogenous groups, strongly influence the group memberships.  This distinction between 
exogenous and endogenous groups is important in that a complete memberships theory 
requires both an explanation of how groups form as well as what influences the groups 
exert on individuals.  Thus a model demonstrating that residential neighborhoods have 
strong effects on the future economic prospects for children cannot explain poverty traps 
without explaining how children from rich and poor families are exposed to different 
neighborhoods.
4  Put differently, in the case of endogenous groups, the effects of these 
groups on individuals must be linked with an understanding of how these groups form.  
In particular, endogenous groups will generate persistent inequality when they are a 
manifestation of some form of segregation, so that different groups generate different 
influences on their members.  
Memberships models have in fact addressed issues of social and economic 
segregation.
5  An important precursor to current models is work by Schelling (1971) on 
the emergence of segregated communities. Schelling’s analysis asked how segregation 
                                                 
4The distinction between exogenous and endogenous memberships may be criticized on 
the grounds that for exogenous groups, there is a question of why only certain groups are 
psychologically and socially salient.  Eye color and skin color are both exogenous by my 
categorization, yet only one has any importance in US society. The salience of certain 
groups seems closely tied up with issues of personal identity.  Further, there are good 
reasons to believe that group salience is malleable, or at least the ascriptions assigned to 
groups are changeable.  One interesting example is the dislike of the “big, blonde, smelly 
barbarians” of the North” among citizens of the Roman Empire (Wells (1992) pg. 199), 
which contrasts with contemporary prejudices, though to be clear, Roman prejudices 
seem to be driven more by customs than physical characteristics (Sherwin-White (1970)). 
Frederickson (2002) further observes that modern forms of racism against those with dark 
skin were absent from Europe during the Middle Ages; indeed he argues that parts of 
Northern and Central Europe exhibited forms of “negrophilia” (Frederickson (2002), pg. 
26). For these reasons, recent work by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) is potentially quite 
important.   
5In terms of residential neighborhoods, see Massey and Denton (1993) and Jargorsky 
(1997) respectively for detailed descriptions of the persistently high levels of racial and 
economic segregation in the United States.  Quillian (2002) is an important effort to 
establish why racial segregation is so persistent, concluding that the unwillingness of 
whites to move into nonwhite neighborhoods is a primary factor.  This is an example of 
how intergroup interactions have important consequences, which is relevant to 
understanding racial inequality, an issue to which I will return below.   5 
can emerge in environments in which the individual actors possess “mild” preferences to 
be in an ethnic majority in their communities. (If one assumes everyone wants 
segregation, there is really nothing to explain.)  Schelling showed how the sequential 
neighborhood choices of individuals, combined with such preferences, will lead to 
segregated outcomes, even if all individuals would ideally want to live in segregated 
communities.  More rigorous formulations of the Schelling model have been developed 
by Young (1998) among others, and the basic insight has proven to be robust.   
Other memberships models have focused on how economic segregation can arise.  
Bénabou (1993,1996), Durlauf (1996a,b), Fernandez and Rogerson (1997) have all 
shown how local public finance and social interactions can lead to segregation of 
communities by income.  In these models, families prefer affluent neighbors due to their 
effects on the tax base as well as the role model influences that they produce.  This 
segregation is not necessarily socially efficient, as shown by Durlauf and Seshadri 
(2002), hence there is no implication that observed degrees of economic segregation are a 
corollary of mechanisms that maximize aggregate output or some other measure of 
economic success.  
Within the economics and other social science literatures, a broad range of 
mechanisms linking group memberships to inequality have been studied. One source of 
these effects falls under the general category of local public goods provision.  Despite the 
existence of state and federal programs to assist less affluent school districts, the role of 
local public finance in education produces large disparities in educational expenditure 
across school districts; indeed Hussar and Sonnenberg (2001) and Murray, Evans, and 
Schwab (1998) document that large differences in per pupil expenditures persist across 
districts in the United States.
6  While there is considerable controversy over the 
relationship between school expenditures and inequality, well summarized by the papers 
in Burtless (1996), there is little dispute that poorer neighborhoods are generally 
associated with lower quality schools; Kozol (1991) provides an impassioned 
ethnographic study that describes how schools in very poor districts are hurt by lack of 
resources.
7  My own conclusion based on reading both the school expenditures/quality 
literature as well as ethnographies is that while a general relationship between school 
expenditures per capita and educational quality has proven hard to establish, schools in 
                                                 
6Murray, Evans and Schwab (1998, pg. 799), find that the ratio of per pupil expenditures 
for the 95
th percentile to the 5
th percentile across US schools was 2.72 in 1972, 2.22 in 
1982 and 2.40 in 1992. These authors also find that court mandated reduction of 
educational disparities within states have been efficacious.  Hussar and Sonnenberg 
(2001) find some overall reduction in expenditure disparities at the district level between 
1980 and 1994, but caution that the decreases are not uniform across states and that large 
differences remain. 
7An indirect source of evidence of this is Neal (1997) who shows how the benefits of 
Catholic schools are particularly high for students who would otherwise attend inner city 
schools.  It is reasonable to conjecture that the gap between public and Catholic schools 
in poor neighborhoods is especially large due to the poor quality of the public schools, 
not the unusually high quality of the Catholic ones in poor areas.  At a minimum, Neal’s 
work indicates that there is something very wrong with schools in poor neighborhoods, 
which is all the memberships theory really needs to rely on.      6 
poor communities probably do suffer because of lack of resources. Hence very poor 
neighborhoods affect children along this dimension. 
Other sources of neighborhood effects are more sociological and/or psychological 
in nature and such effects fall under the rubric of social interactions.  One example of 
social interactions is role model effects, in which the behavior of one individual in a 
group is influenced by the characteristics of and earlier behaviors of older members of the 
group. Another form of social interactions is peer group influences; these differ from role 
model effects because they refer to contemporaneous behavioral influences and so may 
be reciprocal. Role model and peer group influences are both usually understood to 
produce some sort of imitative behavior, either contemporaneous or across age cohorts.  
This imitative behavior may be due to 1) psychological factors, an intrinsic desire to 
behave like certain others, 2) interdependences in the constraints that individuals face, so 
that the costs of a given behavior depend on whether others due the same, or 3) 
interdependences in information transmission, so that the behavior of others alters the 
information on the effects of such behaviors available to a given individual.
8  Each of 
these types of imitative behavior implies that an individual, when assessing alternative 
behavioral choices, will find a given behavior relatively more desirable if others have or 
are behaving in the same way. Hence the relative desirability of staying in school is 
higher when adults in a community are college graduates or when one’s peers are also 
staying in school. 
This approach provides a formal analog to the important descriptive work that has 
been done by sociologists on group effects and persistent poverty.  In this work, in which 
Wilson (1987) is probably the best known modern example, the role of the social 
isolation of the poor is given primary attention.  Wilson (1987, pg. 60-61) writes 
 
The patterns of behavior that are associated with a life of casual work (tardiness 
and absenteeism) are quite different from those that accompany a life of regular or 
steady work (e.g., the habit of waking up early in the morning to a ringing alarm 
clock). In neighborhoods in which nearly every family has at least one person who 
is steadily employed, the norms and behavior patterns that emanate from a life of 
regularized employment become part of the community gestalt. On the other hand, 
in neighborhoods in which most families do not have a steady breadwinner, the 
norms and behavior patterns associated with steady work compete with those 
associated with casual or infrequent work. 
 
While formal memberships theories are far from capturing the richness of studies 
such as this, they provide a way of understanding how in a social and economic 
equilibrium, these types of forces can perpetuate themselves and also, via their formal 
structure, ways of subjecting the primary assumptions that underlie more descriptive 
work to statistical evaluation. 
                                                 
8 Roemer and Wets (1995) and Streufert (2000) show how economic segregation can lead 
to inaccurate assessments of the economic payoff to education.  The basic idea in this 
type of analysis is that by depriving children in poor neighborhoods of successful role 
models (which is a necessary consequence of economic segregation), inferences on the 
benefits to education are made biased.   7 
 
Memberships models and poverty traps 
 
Social interactions of the type embodied in role model and peer group effects can, 
when strong enough, produce poverty traps in particular contexts.  To see the logic 
behind this claim, suppose that educational investment decisions exhibit strong role 
model influences, so that the decision to attend college for each high school graduate in a 
community is strongly (and positively) related to the percentage of college graduates 
among adults in a community.  Such dependence creates the possibility that if one has 
two communities, one where the adults are all college graduates, and a second where 
none are, that these communities will converge to different levels of college attendance in 
a steady state.  High and low college attendance rates are each reinforced across time as 
high (low) attendance rates among the current pool of adults lead to high (low) 
attendance rates among high school graduates, who in the future will influence the high 
school graduates to collectively exhibit high (low) rates as well.  One way to think about 
a poverty trap is that a community, if initially comprised of poor members, will remain 
poor across long time periods, even generations.  Intertemporal social interactions  (i.e. 
social interactions in which choices made at one time affect others in the future) provide 
precisely this sort of dependence. 
A related notion of a poverty trap may be identified when one thinks about peer 
group effects.  When the behavior of one member of a group is sufficiently positively 
dependent on the behaviors of others, this creates a degree of freedom in behavior of the 
group as a whole.  Contemporaneous dependences in behavior mean that the members of 
a group will behave similarly.  At the same time, these effects, when sufficiently strong, 
mean that the characteristics of the individuals involved will not uniquely determine what 
the group actually does.  Dependence on history, reactions to common influences, etc. 
may determine which sort of average behavior actually transpires.  The key idea, 
however, is that strong contemporaneous dependences in behavior lead to multiple 
possibilities for self-reinforcing behavior in groups.  Within a given behavioral 
configuration, each individual is acting “rationally” in the usual sense. That does not 
mean that each self-consistent configuration is equally desirable from the perspective of 
the members of the group.  Another definition of a poverty trap is a socially undesirable 
(in the sense of producing poverty across a community) collection of behaviors in which 
the behaviors are mutually reinforcing and so individually rational. 
The value of the formal structure of memberships theories can be seen in 
considering the conditions under which poverty traps occur. What does it mean for social 
interactions to be “strong” enough to produce poverty traps?  One way to understand this 
is to ask when social interactions are irrelevant for poverty effects.  Consider the question 
of why high school drop out rates are low in rich communities. One would want to argue 
that this occurs because rich communities fortuitously have achieved high rates of school 
completion that reinforce themselves across time.  A better explanation is that the 
economic prospects of students in rich communities are such that they induce high rates 
of graduation regardless of the social interactions effects that are present.  Notice that 
there is an asymmetry when one considers poor communities.  Lesser economic prospects 
for graduates who reside in poor communities mean that a greater potential role exists for 
social interactions to produce low graduation rates.  In theoretical work (Brock and   8 
Durlauf (2001a,b)) this idea is formalized as it is shown that the possibility of multiple 
equilibria in average group outcomes depends in a complicated way on the 
interrelationship between private incentives and social influences.  A basic implication of 
this work is that a given level (i.e. the strength) of social interactions can only produce a 
poverty trap when the private incentives to choices that avoid poverty are sufficiently 
weak.  This interplay of private and social influences on behavior adds some nuance to 
conventional claims in public policy debates.  Policy debates often seem to dichotomize 
between those who ascribe the persistence of ghettoes to lack of economic opportunity 
versus those who believe the explanation lies in a culture of poverty.  Formal 
memberships models such as Brock and Durlauf (2001b) make clear that these are not 
separate explanations.  Socially undesirable equilibria, which seem to correspond to 
culture of poverty claims, can only exist when economic opportunities are weak.  Hence 
the two explanations are in reality complementary. 
It is possible for social interaction effects to reinforce the effects of changes in 
private incentives.  Suppose one is considering whether to provide college scholarships to 
randomly chosen students across a set of high schools versus concentrating the 
scholarships among students within a given school.  If the objective of the program is to 
alter high school graduation rates, then the presence of social interactions can, other 
things equal, mean that the concentration of the scholarships will be more efficacious.  
Assuming the direct incentive effect of the scholarships is the same for students across 
schools, the advantage of concentrating the scholarships in one school is that they will 
induce social interaction effects that affect all students in the school, including those who 
have not been offered scholarships.
9  More generally, social interaction effects can 
amplify the effects of altering private incentives; this amplification is sometimes known 
as a “social multiplier” following Manski (1993).  The presence of social multipliers has 
important implications for the design of policies that have yet to be explored. 
While the memberships theory is hardly unique in its ability to produce poverty 
traps, there are several senses in which the theory makes poverty traps seem particularly 
plausible.  Since poverty traps are so socially undesirable, an obvious question is how the 
individuals in the trap are precluded from escaping.  In memberships models, the various 
group effects that induce the trap represent externalities, i.e. they constitute effects that 
because they are collective and lie outside the range of economic contracts, are not 
amenable to market or collective action solutions.  There is no direct market by which 
good role models can be compensated for the social interactions effects they induce, nor 
is there any collective action mechanism to coordinate the behavior of peer influences.  
Instead, markets help facilitate the sorts of economic and social segregation that are 
necessary for poverty traps. Hence, the basic logic of memberships models suggests why 
poverty may be perpetuated over long time spans. 
 
Relationship to racial inequality 
 
                                                 
9This discussion is designed to provide intuition, not a formal argument.  In order to 
formally demonstrate the differential effects between the two scholarship scenarios, some 
(not particularly interesting) auxiliary assumptions are necessary.   9 
An additional important aspect of memberships theories is that they refocus 
attention to the role of race in persistent poverty in ways that move beyond the simplistic 
“persistence of discrimination” sorts of arguments that one finds in popular discussions.
10  
Without meaning in any way to suggest that existing levels are either unimportant or 
morally odious, I do not believe that racial differences in socioeconomic attainment can 
be ascribed to ongoing discrimination. In the case of wages, within the economics 
literature, there are no strong grounds for supposing that discrimination is a first order 
factor in explaining black/white wage differences.  Neal and Johnson (1996) find that 
75% of the wage gap between blacks and whites can be attributed to differences in skills 
acquired before entering the labor market.
11  For this reason, one needs to identify factors 
that can explain how a history of discrimination can produce lasting effects, something 
memberships theories can do.   
Similarly, memberships theories give content to arguments that the legacy of 
slavery explains contemporary socioeconomic problems.  By itself, legacy of slavery 
explanations of current racial inequality are implausible as they fail to explain how 
adverse initial conditions can persist over long time periods.  Memberships models by 
focusing on the feedback from contemporaneous to future group characteristics and 
behaviors provide precisely such a link. 
The recognition that group-level factors translate a history of discrimination into 
contemporary inequality does not mitigate the obligations of society to alleviate this 
deprivation.  Nothing in the memberships theory implies that the disadvantaged are 
morally responsible for their situation.  This is true in two senses.  First, the memberships 
models explain how adverse initial conditions can persist; these conditions are by 
definition not the responsibility of current generations.
12 
13  Second, given the collective 
                                                 
10While most poor people are white, poverty rates are dramatically higher among African 
Americans. In 2002, 7.5% of all non-Hispanic whites were living below the official 
poverty line as opposed to 22.1% of African Americans. Among children, the differences 
are even more dramatic, with 9.4% of white children (under age 18) in poverty versus 
30.9% of African Americans.  (US Census, Poverty in the United States: 2000, series 
P60-214). These differences, however, do not necessarily bear any causal relationship to 
ethnic groups. What memberships models can address is whether race per se is a useful 
explanatory category in understanding these differences. 
11Heckman (1998) provides a powerful critique of empirical studies purporting to identify 
racial discrimination as a causal factor in socioeconomic outcomes.  A deep problem with 
many empirical studies claiming to identify discrimination is that they in essence equate 
discrimination with an unexplained difference in some outcome such as wages between 
blacks and whites.  By unexplained, I refer to a residual difference in average outcomes 
after controls have been made for group differences such as levels of educational 
attainment. But such an identification of a residual difference between racial groups as 
discrimination is question begging since it presupposes all other factors differentiating 
the groups have been controlled for. 
12Similarly, the memberships theory makes clear that the economic disadvantage of a 
given group is not a function of its own failings so much as the arbitrariness of history, 
especially in terms of undesirable initial conditions; any group could in principle have 
experienced (or for that matter, at some point in the future could experience) the same   10 
externalities implicit in memberships models, the notion of individual responsibilities is 
vacuous.  As Glenn Loury (2002, pg. 105) has written: 
 
Consider the so-called black underclass−the poor central-city dwellers who make 
up perhaps a quarter of the African American population.  In the face of the 
despair, violence, and self-destructive folly of so many of these people, it is 
morally superficial in the extreme to argue as many conservatives do now that “if 
those people would just get their acts together, like many of the poor immigrants, 
we would not have such a horrific problem in our cities.” To the contrary, any 
morally astute response to the “social pathology” of American history’s losers 
would conclude that, while we cannot change our ignoble past, we need not and 
must not be indifferent to the contemporary suffering issuing directly from the past, 
for which we must bear some collective responsibility.  
 
The consideration of racial inequality also reveals an important limitation of most 
memberships models.  As described, memberships models rely on the internal generation 
of group effects. In other words, in most memberships models, the behavior of 
individuals outside a group typically does not directly affect the members in the group.  
(Of course, the behavior of outsiders may have determined the group memberships.)  In 
the case of race, this perspective is fundamentally incomplete.  In the case of African 
Americans, what matters is not only within group dynamics, but the attitudes of the rest 
of society.  One cannot discuss the formation of social norms, aspirations, and the like 
among poor African Americans without accounting for the ways in which these attitudes 
affect perceptions of self-worth and self-efficacy.  Similarly, the ability for African 
Americans to succeed in the economy and society as whole depends on how they are 
perceived and assessed by the white majority.
14 One obvious case where social 
interactions between blacks and whites matter is through the emergence and stability of 
racial segregation. The effects I focus on now refer less to how race influences other 
group memberships such as residential neighborhoods, but on how interracial interactions 
affect African American outcomes.  
Some of the ways in which the behavior of those outside the group of African 
Americans influences African American socioeconomic outcomes are captured in models 
                                                                                                                                                 
outcomes.  As Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man said, after chronicling many of the 
difficulties of black life in America: “Who knows, but that, on the lower frequencies, I 
speak for you?” (Ellison (1980) pg. 581).  
13Memberships models also reveal a fundamental flaw in the periodic efforts by some to 
at least partly attribute black/white inequality to genetic factors, the most famous recent 
effort being Herrnstein and Murray (1994).  To focus on Herrnstein and Murray, nothing 
in their empirical work seriously considers the possibility of long run effects on measured 
academic performance due to adverse initial conditions. In some sense, their failure to 
properly consider alternative explanations parallels the critique I have made of studies of 
discrimination.   
14Notice as well that this form of social interactions, because it locates the source of the 
interactions outside the disadvantaged group, renders the “blaming the victim” criticism 
irrelevant.   11 
of statistical discrimination. See Aigner and Cain (1977), Arrow (1973), Lundberg and 
Startz (1983), and Phelps (1972) for the foundations of this theory.  The basic intuitions 
underlying statistical discrimination models can be clearly seen in the Lundberg-Startz 
analysis of educational investment. In this model, the incentives for African Americans to 
invest in education are reduced by the inability of employers to assess the productivity of 
African American workers as accurately as for white workers.  This differential means 
that the wage effect from investments by African American in education is lower than 
whites.  In equilibrium, blacks and whites with identical native abilities receive different 
wages because of this discrepancy. Notice that when one moves to more invidious 
notions of discrimination (i.e. a prejudice that blacks are less productive than whites) one 
can similarly produce self-confirming equilibria of this type as the unwillingness of 
employers to hire blacks on the claim they are less productive will similarly reduce 
incentives for education. 
However, whether one considers either ethnographies of the inner city (to be 
discussed below), or even fictional portrayals of black life in America, be it Richard 
Wright’s Native Son or James Baldwin’s If Beale Street Could Talk, it is clear that there 
are deeper psychological effects at work. Whether thought of as self-confirming 
stereotypes, socially conditioned anti-mainstream values, or whatever, the ways in which 
whites perceive and value African Americans can produce powerful influences on black 
attitudes and outcomes.  Not surprisingly, in the context of American history, these 
effects are quite harmful. Loury (2002) is a profound analysis of this broad issue of 
“racial stigma”: 
 
By “racial dishonor” I mean…an entrenched if inchoate presumption of inferiority, 
of moral inadequacy, of unfitness for intimacy, of intellectual incapacity, harbored 
by observing agents when hey regard the race-marked subjects…“racial stigma” 
alludes to this lingering residue in post-slavery American political culture of the 
dishonor engendered by racial slavery.  It is crucial to understand that this is not 
mainly an issue of the personal attitudes of individual Americans…I am discussing 
social meanings… (pg. 70). 
 
Important evidence of how African Americans are affected by the attitudes of 
others may be found in the work of psychologist Claude Steele.  Steele has conducted a 
series of experiments to evaluate what he terms “stereotype threat” (cf. Steele 
(1992,1997), Steele and Aronson (1995)).  In these experiments, groups of randomly 
selected black and white students are administered identical tests.  Sometimes the 
students are told that the test measures intelligence, sometimes they are told that they will 
simply be solving problems.  What Steele found is that African American students 
typically performed much more poorly when told the test measured intelligence.   Steele 
plausibly interprets these performance differences as reflecting the anxieties that 
stereotypes of racial inferiority impose on its victims. 
Arguments such as Loury’s and evidence such as Steele’s lead me to believe that 
the mapping of racial stigma into formal memberships models is arguably the most 
important next step in terms of the development of the theory. 
 
   12 




With respect to the general question of whether group memberships affect 
individual behavior, there is a wealth of contexts where this dependence has been 
established.  The best evidence is probably found in the social psychology literature.  
Large scale experiments such as the celebrated “Robbers Cave” study of Sherif et al 
(1961) have shown, for example, how the act of assigning arbitrary group memberships 
among subsets of an essentially homogeneous group, in this case by labeling members of 
a group of white teenage boys as “rattlers” or “eagles”, can produce hostility across group 
members when none existed before.  In other words, this study showed how even the 
arbitrary labeling of individuals can lead to intergroup prejudices and intragroup 
solidarity.   
Asch (1956) describes another set of experiments that provide insight into the 
power of groups.  In this work, an individual is asked to identify which of three lines is 
closest in length to a given line.  The lines are chosen so that one answer is clearly 
correct.  However, each subject in the experiment is paired with four others each of 
whom gives what is (just as clearly) the same wrong answer.  Asch found that typically, a 
third of the experiment subjects would give the same wrong answer when their turns 
came.  This finding has proven to be quite robust (Aronson (1999)). One important 
extension of the original experiment is due to Morris and Miller (1975) who found that 
the presence of even a single participant who gives the correct answer strongly reduces 
the likelihood the subject will conform to majority opinion.  This suggests how fairly 
subtle changes in a group’s composition can have strong influences on individual 
behaviors. 
Historical studies are another interesting source of information.  One cannot read 
Herodotus or Thucydides without being struck by how the societies of Athens and Sparta 
were to produce unique and remarkable personality traits among their citizens
15. The 
stability of Athenian democracy in the presence of plague, overwhelming defeat in the 
Peloponnesian War and the emplacement of an oligarchy by occupying troops can only 
be attributed to something self-reinforcing in the Athenian character; this is part of why 
Pericles could describe Athens as “the school of Hellas.” Similarly, the social interactions 
in Sparta were able to produce a self-perpetuating martial culture that for centuries was 
the envy of the ancient world. In a famous exchange, the Persian Great King Xerxes is 
warned not to underestimate Spartan soldiers because “…fighting together they are the 
best soldiers in the world.  They are free-yes-but not entirely free, for they have a master, 
and that master is Law, which they fear far more than your subjects fear you. Whatever 
this master commands, they do...” What is remarkable is how these small geographically 
proximate city states (Athens was by far the largest with perhaps 25,000 citizens at its 
peak) were able to generate such different yet internally stable cultures. 
Examples closer to our time concern the behavior of troops in battle.  It is a 
commonplace that the willingness of soldiers to risk their lives varies immensely across 
context and that it is greatly influenced by social interactions.  More formal analyses bear 
                                                 
15Herodotus (7.104)   13 
this out.  For example, Costa and Kahn (2001) document how social interactions within 
regiments influenced how Union soldiers behaved during the Civil War. Other studies of 
violence, in less defensible contexts, find similar results. Nisbett and Cohen (1996) argue 
that “Southern exceptionalism” in levels of violence may be understood by “collective 
manifestations ranging from shared assumptions about the beliefs of others to 
institutional codes including laws and social policies.” (pg. 83). 
Finally, there are a range of social science studies that support the importance of 
social interactions. A particularly interesting case due to the range of available data 
concerns patterns in first names, something explored by Lieberson (2000).  Lieberson 
documents how fluctuations in the popularity of names reflect a host of social factors 
including perceptions of class and ethnic identity. Similar findings are common in the 
sociolinguistics literature.  For the United States, dialect differences along class and 
ethnic lines have been well documented and are generally regarded as containing an 
important social component as individuals make dialect choices in order to achieve 
identification with one group and perhaps for differentiation from others.
16  In the case of 
African American Vernacular English (AAVE) or Black English, I suspect these choices 
are economically important as it is easy to imagine how AAVE could have strong effects 
on labor market success (consider the reactions of job interviewers to AAVE). 
Of course, one cannot leap to claims about the empirical relevance of social 
interactions as a source of poverty traps from this type of information. The fact that the 
communities in Greek city states contained strong enough social interactions to produce 
unique characters does not imply that rates of nonmarital fertility in inner cities can be 
explained the same way. My argument, rather, is that the plausibility of memberships as a 
mechanism for producing poverty traps is enhanced when one recognizes the many 
contexts in which one can identify social interaction effects.  As we will see, the direct 
statistical evidence on the memberships theory suffers from a number of limitations and 
interpretation problems.  Hence, this type of background information is important in 




Within the social science literature there is a rich ethnographic tradition in the 
study of poverty and ghettoes. Classic studies include Lewis (1966), Liebow (1967) and 
Hannerz (1971); important recent contributions include Anderson (1990,1999) and 
Duneier (1992).  This literature provides a compelling description of many of the social 
interactions that form the basis of the memberships theory.  To be clear, the ethnographic 
literature is hardly uniform in its descriptions of poor communities or poor people.   
Duneier (1992), in fact is highly critical of ethnographers who ignore the many positive 
aspects of the social structure and moral lives of the poor.  But these disagreements 
highlight the importance of carefully accounting for individual heterogeneity in modeling 
any community, rather than vitiate the importance of social factors in influencing 
individuals per se. The sorts of insights one can take from these studies is exemplified by 
how Anderson (1999, pg. 324-325) concludes his study of inner city violence: 
                                                 
16See Labov (2001) and Wolfram and Schilling-Estes (1998) for overviews and 
references.   14 
 
Neighbors in the inner city are encouraged to choose between an abstract code of 
justice and a practical code geared toward survival in the public spaces of their 
community. Increasingly, inner-city residents are opting for the code of the streets, 
either as a conscious decision to protect themselves and their self-esteem or as a gut 
reaction to a suddenly dangerous situation.  Children growing up in these 
circumstances learn early in life that this is the way things are, and the lessons of 
those who might teach them otherwise become less and less relevant.  Surrounded 
by violence and what many view as municipal indifference…the decent people are 
finding it increasingly difficult to maintain a sense of community.   
 
A vicious circle has thus been formed. The hopelessness many young inner city 
black men and women feel, largely as a result of endemic joblessness and 
alienation, fuels the violence they engage in.  This violence then serves to confirm 
the negative feelings many whites and some middle-class blacks harbor towards the 
ghetto poor, further legitimizing the oppositional culture… 
 
While this type of evidence may not possess the rigor associated with formal 




When one moves from ethnographic to formal empirical analyses, the evidence 
becomes much more problematic.  In fact, it has proven relatively difficult to produce 
statistical evidence in support of memberships explanations of poverty and inequality.  
This is not to say that there is any shortage of papers that provide empirical evidence of 
such effects.
17  Well known examples of such studies include Brewster (1994), Brooks-
Gunn et al (1993), Corcoran et al (1992), Crane (1991), Datcher (1982), Ginther, 
Haveman and Wolfe (2000), Plotnick and Hoffman (1999), South and Baumer (2000), 
South and Crowder (1999), and Topa (2001). These studies are important empirical 
contributions from the perspective of establishing empirical relationships between 
individual behaviors and group characteristics and have played an important role in 
stimulating the memberships theory I have described.  However, interpreting these 
empirical exercises as evidence of a causal role for group memberships in explaining 
individual outcomes is problematic.  
To understand the difficulties that exist in empirically identifying a causal role for 
groups in determining individual outcomes, it is useful to consider a specific example. 
Suppose that a researcher wishes to evaluate the effect of high poverty neighborhoods on 
teenage educational attainment, such as completion of high school.  The crude fact 
leading one to believe such an effect is present is a bivariate relationship between high 
poverty neighborhoods and low educational attainment. In isolation, this fact says 
nothing about a causal role for neighborhoods in education since it is clear that there are 
many reasons why such a relationship could exist.  Possibilities include 
                                                 
17The standard survey of empirical work on neighborhood effects is Jencks and Mayer 
(1990).  A number of more recent studies are reviewed in Brock and Durlauf (2001b).   15 
 
1.  High poverty neighborhoods are disproportionately composed of adults with low 
labor market aspirations (as compared to more affluent communities).  If parents 
transmit low aspirations to their own children, and if these low aspirations 
adversely influence educational attainment, then poor neighborhoods will exhibit 
lower educational attainment than richer ones, without any causal influence from 
the neighborhood to the individual.  
 
2.  Families in high poverty neighborhoods are less likely to be able to finance post-
secondary education, hence the opportunities for further education generated by a 
high school diploma are not available to many teenagers in these neighborhoods.
18 
 
3.  High poverty neighborhoods possess a relatively high concentration of individuals 
who, despite graduating from high school, failed to achieve success in the labor 
market.  Hence teenagers observing the economic benefits of graduation will not 
observe examples where graduation had much of a payoff. 
 
4.  Teenagers are influenced by the aspirations of role models in the community 
where they live. If the role models in a neighborhood have low labor market 
aspirations, then this will depress the educational achievements of children in the 
neighborhood. 
 
5.  Teenagers in high poverty neighborhoods are, due to local public finance, higher 
crime, etc. provided lower quality schools than students in other communities. 
 
6.  Teenagers are influenced by the behaviors of their peers through a basic desire to 
conform to others. In a given community, high and low levels of educational 
attainment are self-reinforcing as the educational effort of a given teenager 
reflects his preference to seem like “one of the crowd.” 
 
Each of these explanations will produce the same correlations between low individual 
educational attainment and neighborhood poverty, but each is based on a different causal 
mechanism.  The statistical question is whether these different explanations can be 
disentangled in a given data set. 
Manski (1993) provides a valuable decomposition of how within-group 
correlations can arise.  He describes three distinct causal mechanisms: correlated 
individual characteristics, which refer to the idea that individuals within a group have 
similar individual-level influences, contextual effects, which refer to the ideas that 
individuals within a group are exposed to common influences, and endogenous effects, 
which refer to the idea that individuals in a group make behavioral choices that depend 
on the choices of others.  These different sources of within-group correlations have very 
different implications both for understanding the determinants of group level deprivation 
as well as for policy.  For example, correlated individual effects indicate that group-level 
                                                 
18Carneiro and Heckman (2002) conclude that about 4% of teenagers are constrained 
from attending school due to family finances.   16 
differences can arise even when the memberships theory is empirical vacuous.  Similarly, 
contextual and endogenous effects will influence the way one thinks about policy 
interventions since, as argued earlier, the presence of endogenous effects has particular 
implications, via social multipliers, for how changes in private incentives affect group 
behavior. In our poverty/education example, the first and second explanations attribute 
the correlation of neighborhood poverty and low individual educational attainment to 
correlated individual effects, i.e. similarities in parental characteristics.  Explanations 
three, four, and five are examples of contextual effects as the distribution of educational 
levels and incomes among older members of the community are affecting current 
behaviors.  Explanation six is based on endogenous effects as it captures the 
contemporaneous interdependences in behavior.   
A recent literature has begun to develop a statistical framework for disentangling 
these different sources for correlations between group characteristics and individual 
outcomes, cf. Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b), Manski (1993), Moffitt (2001).  The basic 
messages of this research are severalfold.  One general finding is that for linear 
behavioral models, one needs prior information on the relationship between individual 
and contextual effects in order for the three various explanations to be empirically 
distinguishable.  The intuitive problem is that endogenous effects and contextual effects 
are interconnected because endogenous effects (the behavior of others) are determined by 
the same contextual effects that affect an individual directly. This creates a possible 
multicollinearity in the regression description for individual behavior. The presence of 
some correlated individual characteristics, specifically, characteristics that prevent a 
perfect correlation between the variable analogues of the endogenous and contextual 
effects, is needed to achieve identification (Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b)).  Another 
important point (Manski (1993,2000)) is that without prior information on which groups 
generate causal effects, little can be said.  An unfortunate feature of the existing empirical 
literature on group effects is that it essentially ignores the identification problems 
addressed in this theoretical work.   
Beyond the issue of identification of different sources of group effects, in those 
contexts where group membership is endogenous, there is the more difficult problem of 
self-selection.  This is most obvious in the case of residential neighborhoods where one 
naturally would think that the same factors that determine the neighborhood in which an 
individual lives also influence how an individual behaves once he is in the neighborhood.  
For the poverty/education example, parental decisions on neighborhood presumably 
reflect factors concerning parental quality that influence offspring decisions.  These 
factors, further, are at least to some extent going to be unobservable, so the self-selection 
problem is not simply a matter of including controls for individual characteristics when 
attempting to uncover group effects. With very few exceptions (e.g. Aaronson (1998), 
which finds some evidence of neighborhood effects and Evans, Oates, and Schwab 
(1992), which does not), empirical studies of neighborhood effects based on 
observational data have failed to deal seriously with the possible statistical biases induced 
by self-selection into neighborhoods. 
 
Recent advances: quasi-experiments and new data sources 
    17 
An important alternative to the use of observational data such as the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics is the use of data in which government interventions into the 
residential choices of individuals are used to assess the effects of neighborhoods.  Such 
interventions are examples of what in economics are known as “quasi-experiments,” the 
idea being that the intervention at least partially defines groups of individuals who have 
or have not randomly received a treatment (drawing an analogy from biostatistics), in this 
case, a new group membership, thereby allowing for the measurement of group effects. 
One example of such an intervention is the Gautreaux program. In 1967, Dorothy 
Gautreaux led a group of plaintiffs to sue the Chicago Housing Authority, claiming that 
placement of poor families in public housing in poor neighborhoods constituted a form of 
discrimination.  A consent decree between the plaintiffs and the CHA resolved the case 
and produced a housing program that in essence assigned one group of families to other 
parts of Chicago and another to suburban communities outside the city.  Sociologist 
James Rosenbaum has organized and conducted interviews with families that had 
participated in the program in order to determine the effects of living in suburban 
communities on poor families. In a series of studies (cf, Rosenbaum and Popkin (1991), 
Rosenbaum (1995)), he showed that families living in suburbs experienced substantially 
better socioeconomic outcomes along a number of dimensions.  As described in 
Rosenbaum (1995. pg. 242), these differences are particularly pronounced with respect to 
outcomes for children.  For example, the percentage of college attendees among children 
moved to suburbs was 54% whereas the percentage for children whose moves kept them 
in the city of Chicago was 21%; when one considers only 4-year colleges the attendance 
rates are 27% versus 4%. While these data suffer from some self-selection problems that 
render their causal interpretation problematic (an issue well understood by Rosenbaum), 
they are extremely suggestive and have greatly helped to stimulate research on 
neighborhood effects.
19 
The Gautreaux findings, combined with a recognition of the limitations of the 
program as a source of information led to an important new quasi-experiment.  A recent 
program by the Department of Housing and Urban Development represents an important 
new source of information on neighborhood effects.  This program, the Moving to 
Opportunity (MTO) demonstration has been underway in five cities, Baltimore, Boston, 
Chicago, Los Angeles and New York since 1994.  The demonstration provides housing 
vouchers to a randomly selected group of families; within this subsidized group, families 
in turn were randomly allocated between unrestricted vouchers (users are known as the 
                                                 
19Rosenbaum’s analyses compare families that were moved to alternate public housing in 
Chicago to families that stayed in the suburbs; those that moved and then returned to 
Chicago are not included.  This means the sample of suburban families differs from a 
random selection of families in that it consists of those families who were willing to 
forgo the benefits of the city (proximity to family and friends, etc.).  Such families might 
well tend to have parents who place an unusually high value on economic achievement, 
so the success of their offspring, for example, might be due to this latent variable and not 
the suburban environment per se.  While the differences may be due to neighborhood 
effects, one simply cannot determine this from the data.     18 
Section 8 group) and vouchers that could only be used in census tracts with poverty rates 
below 10% (whose users are the Experimental group).
20   
Recent evaluations of the effects of the vouchers include Katz, Kling and 
Liebman (2001), Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschfield (2001) and Rosenbaum and Harris 
(2001).  These assessments reveal impressive gains for both Section 8 and MTO movers 
along several dimensions.  Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001, pg. 648) conclude in the 
case of Boston area families 
 
We find that children in both the Experimental and Section 8 Comparison groups 
exhibit fewer behavioral problems, and that Experimental group children have 
lower prevalence of injuries, asthma attacks, and personal crimes.  In contrast, 
changes in neighborhoods induced by MTO have not affected the employment 
rates, earnings or welfare usage by a statistically detectable amount for household 
heads. However, there do appear to be significant improvements in the general 
health status and mental health of household heads. 
 
Ludwig, Duncan and Hirschfeld (2001, pg. 674) find even quite striking evidence that 
neighborhood moves reduce incidents of juvenile crime, finding that moves from high 
to low poverty neighborhoods reduce juvenile arrests for violent crimes by something 
from 30% to 50%.  Rosenbaum and Harris (2001, pg. 338) also find economic benefits 
for household heads, with employment rates for Section 8 and MTO families rising 
from 29.3% and 24.5% to 42.9% and 46.3% respectively.  Overall, these are 
impressive changes. 
As important as the MTO demonstration is, there are limitations to the 
information it has provided.  First, the evidence thus far only describes how the vouchers 
have benefited those who have employed them.  Nearly 50% of all eligible families have 
not used the vouchers.  At best (and to be clear this is very carefully discussed by 
researchers involved with MTO), one cannot extrapolate the findings to the broader 
population of the poor. Second, one needs to recognize that much of the benefits of the 
programs may be attributable to the increase in income associated with voucher eligibility 
as opposed to the shift in neighborhoods per se.  The improvements one observed 
between families that employed vouchers with neighborhood poverty restrictions are 
much less dramatic when compared with families who were given unrestricted vouchers 
(which is unsurprising, of course since agents with more options should over all be better 
off) as opposed to those who did not receive vouchers.
21  Third, it is impossible to 
determine what aspects of the different neighborhoods led to improved outcomes.  To 
give one example (one that is discussed by Katz, Kling and Liebman (2001)) the 
reductions in asthma rates may be due to improvements in housing quality (asthma is 
strongly associated with rat infestations) and nothing about the neighborhood per se.   
Finally, there is a question of generalizability.  Moving large numbers of poor families to 
more affluent communities will induce general equilibrium effects in terms of the 
                                                 
20See Goering (1999) for a detailed description of the MTO demonstration. 
21Rosenbaum and Harris (2001, pg. 336) find, for example how among MTO movers, the 
percentage that said the condition of their housing is good or excellent went from 33.9% 
to 80.6%.    19 
locational decisions of other families, the ability of schools in these neighborhoods to 
provide needed services, etc. One can easily imagine that the commitment of affluent 
families to public schools would be ended by a massive influx of poor families into their 
communities.  Hence, one cannot simply assert that the effects of this program will be 
replicated if it is implemented on a wide scale; a point forcefully made in Sobel (2002).  
For these reasons, one cannot blithely use the MTO evidence to advocate large scale 
housing relocation programs as an antipoverty policy, an error one finds in Fiss (2000), 
for example.
22 
Finally, it is important to note that the empirical neighborhoods literature has 
generally provided little insight into the reasons why neighborhoods matter. The typically 
empirical exercise equates neighborhood effects with the statistical significance of a 
neighborhood-level variable in explaining individual behavior, controlling for individual 
characteristics. Crane (1991), for example uses the percentage of managerial and 
professional workers among adults in a community to measure neighborhood 
socioeconomic status, finding this variable helps predict teenage pregnancy and high 
school dropout rates. Such a finding, however, does not reveal anything about causality.  
It is fair to say that the typical study of group effects treats the effects as a black box.  
Notice that this problem also pervades those studies of discrimination that equate black 
white differences that survive the presence of various controls as discrimination. 
For this reason, the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods 
(PHDCN) is particularly important.  This project consists of an extraordinarily detailed 
and ambitious gathering of data across several hundred neighborhoods in Chicago; details 
of the project as well as a number of interesting findings may be found in Sampson, 
Morenoff, and Earls (1999) and Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls (1997). The data from 
this project provide a detailed portrait of the social structures in neighborhoods. As 
described in Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls (1999 pg. 639), the available data include 
responses to questions such as “About how often do you and people in your 
neighborhood do favors for each other?” and the likelihood that one’s neighbors would 
intervene if one’s child were observed skipping school.  The various data collections that 
comprise this project provide a remarkable range of information about the specific social 
relations that underlie the general effects assumed in the memberships theory.  A 
consistent finding in this work is that “collective efficacy,” which consists of measures of 
how a neighborhood provides support for its members, be it though assistance in 
childrearing or trust among neighbors, are an important mediating variable in 
understanding why poor neighborhoods have adverse effects on their members.  Low 
collective efficacy, in turn, seems associated with social problems such as crime.  It is 
important to recognize that research based on this project has not yet come to grips with 
                                                 
22Perhaps a lesson can be taken from a previous policy designed to alter group 
memberships, court ordered segregation plans to achieve racial integration. As 
demonstrated in Smock and Wilson (1991), for example, desegregation orders do not 
appear to have led to sustained increases in integration in the sense that the negative 
relationship between white enrollments to the percentage of blacks in a school and 
associated school district appear the same for schools with and without desegregation 
orders.  This finding means that forces inducing segregation do not seem to have been 
ameliorated by the desegregation programs.   20 
issues of causality versus correlation, so that one cannot really say whether high crime 
reduces collective efficacy or whether the reverse is true.  Nor have the various 
identification problems that I have described been addressed.  Nevertheless, the sort of 
detailed micro-level information produced by the PHDCN is an extremely valuable 
advance towards the eventual goal of uncovering how and why neighborhoods matter. 
 
Where does the evidence stand? 
 
As this section hopefully has made clear, evidence in favor of the memberships 
theory is extremely mixed.  From the perspectives of the social psychology or history 
literatures, the proposition that groups causally influence individuals is uncontroversial.  
Direct efforts to statistically link group effects to poverty or behaviors related to poverty 
have been far less decisive in terms of making the “case” for the memberships theory. 
My own judgment is that the literature on memberships and inequality suffers 
from sufficiently serious problems of interpretation that it should not strongly influence 
one’s prior beliefs about the memberships theory.  I personally find the wealth of 
ethnographic evidence linking group memberships to poverty, when combined with 
background evidence from psychology and history, to be persuasive that these effects 
exist and are important. These beliefs are not weakened and perhaps are marginally 
strengthened by the econometric and statistical evidence that has been marshaled to 
evaluate memberships models. However, there is little reason why a skeptic should be 
persuaded to change his mind by the statistical evidence currently available. 
 
 
4. Memberships, poverty traps and policy 
 
In this section, I want to make three arguments about the implications of group-
based poverty traps for public policy analysis.  First, I wish to argue that memberships 
theories of poverty traps have implications for the types of policies that may be required 
for their elimination.  Second, I want to relate policy evaluation and empirical evidence to 
argue that the nature of poverty traps has implications for how empirical evidence on 




Most discussions of redistribution policies assume that the object available for 
potential redistribution by society is income. This is hardly surprising since many of the 
most visible antipoverty programs, via direct aid such as that provided through 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families and in-kind programs such as Food Stamps or 
Medicaid, in essence transfer income to the poor from the taxes (current and future) paid 
by the rich.  However, income redistribution is not the only way in which the government 
can attempt to achieve more egalitarian outcomes. 
Income redistribution policies alter private incentives and opportunities and 
therefore can affect group memberships such as residential neighborhood. What they do 
not do is directly alter the group compositions that are the main explanatory components 
of memberships theories.  Memberships models naturally lead one to ask whether group   21 
memberships themselves can be the objects of redistribution.  This alternative set of 
policies fall under the rubric of what I have elsewhere (Durlauf (1996c)) termed 
“associational redistribution.” 
Associational redistribution has been an integral part of egalitarian policies 
throughout the twentieth century.  In many ways the most important redistributive 
policies of the twentieth century have focused on the allocation of group memberships in 
American society.  The Brown versus The Board of Education decision of 1954 and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 fundamentally revolved around the question of how society’s 
memberships in particular schools, employment establishment and communities are to be 
determined. Busing to achieve integration is also an example of a program designed to 
alter group (in this case school and classroom) memberships.  In other cases, policy 
decisions have important memberships consequences.  The location of public housing 
projects, shown by Massey and Kanaiaupuni (1993) to have some importance in 
explaining patterns of concentrated poverty, is one example. Charter and magnet schools 
similarly have important associational consequences even if their intent is quite different. 
While the memberships theory clearly suggests that interventions in the 
composition of residential neighborhoods or classrooms can be a powerful stimulus for 
greater equality, it is important to recognize that the political feasibility of such policies is 
very questionable. This is not to say that all such policies will be doomed by public 
opposition.  The reasons why such policies are more or less likely to engender public 
support can be best seen when two policies are contrasted. 
The judicial and legislative end of overt discrimination in the United States is so 
much a part of the accepted public philosophy of the country to be beyond serious 
dispute. The reason for this is not hard to identify.  The forms of associational 
redistribution that produced the breakdown of legal and social discrimination are, in some 
sense, negative, in that they focused on the elimination of race as a factor in determining 
outcomes where it is clearly inessential, to use an idea that underlies John Roemer’s 
seminal work on equality of opportunity (Roemer (1998)).
23  Denying a homeowner the 
right to refuse to sell his home to someone on the basis of ethnicity is easy to defend on 
the grounds that race is irrelevant to the transaction.  Equally important, 
antidiscrimination legislation has proven (at least ex post) to be ethically unproblematic 
as it requires decisions in the public and private sector to embody the notions of equality 
of individuals that underlie the political philosophy of any modern democratic society.  
  The public consensus surrounding this type of associational redistribution 
disappears when one considers one of the major contemporary forms of such 
policies−affirmative action. Affirmative action is nothing more than a class of 
interventions designed to alter the composition of the collections of personnel at 
particular schools or workplaces.  Without question, affirmative action has remained one 
of the most unpopular of all government policies. I do not attribute the level of antipathy 
to affirmative action to underlying racism on the part of the American public. Rather, I 
believe it is because affirmative action requires the downweighting of factors that are 
                                                 
23Roemer (1998) argues that an appropriate definition of equality of opportunity 
explicitly distinguishes between differences in opportunities that are based on factors for 
which a person should be held responsible and factors for which he should be not held 
responsible.     22 
essential to the activities that are affected. For example, grades and test scores are 
informative about academic ability and therefore plausibly relevant to the college 
admissions decision.
24  Given public attachment to various meritocratic ideals, 
affirmative action quite easily arouses opposition.  Similarly, a hypothetical intervention 
into neighborhood composition similarly interferes with what society regards as a 
parent’s legitimate objective to produce the best environment for his children. 
Leaving aside the vital issue of how associational redistribution policies would be 
designed, my conclusion is that there is little hope that such policies, as currently 
formulated, will be politically viable in the current political environment.  While I think 
that compelling equality of opportunity defenses can be made for such policies, until 
there is a shift in public opinion towards a belief in the primacy of such equity 
considerations and away from other, perfectly legitimate, social desiderata, I am 
pessimistic about their prospects. 
 
Supply-side policies for associational redistribution 
 
My pessimism about the political future of standard forms of associational 
redistribution, in particular affirmative action, does not constitute pessimism that all types 
of associational redistribution are doomed to political unpopularity.  I believe one can 
develop an alternative class of policies that are more likely to be politically viable. In 
particular, I believe it is important to develop what Moskos and Butler (1996) have 
referred to as a supply-side approach to associational redistribution.  What I mean is the 
following.  Policies such as affirmative action are demand-side policies in that they 
influence who will be demanded for job, school enrollments, etc. An alternative policy 
would be to alter the supply of individuals in such cases, so that the equilibrium 
allocation of individuals into memberships will be altered to reflect the same diversity 
objectives as the demand-side policy.  These policies require the targeting of resources 
towards disadvantaged groups and so are by no means “race-blind.”  This type of 
government intervention would, however, occur prior to the stage at which admissions 
and the like are determined, thereby negating some of the objections to traditional 
affirmative action policies. 
What does it mean to alter the supply of individuals to schools, firms, etc.? An 
easy way of doing this is to engage in extra search for members of disadvantaged groups 
so as to raise the quality of the applicant pool.  Although actions of this type are certainly 
                                                 
24I use the term plausibly because there is an assumption in debates over affirmative 
action that there exists a compelling merit-based criterion for group memberships that 
such policies necessarily violate.  The existence of a general meritocratic justification for 
determining memberships is, in my view, far from obvious. For example, if one regards 
the objective of publicly funded colleges to be the maximization of human capital in a 
population, why should students with the highest test score or grades merit highest 
priority in admissions?  Under this objective, one would want to admit the set of students 
for whom the college will provide the greatest value added in terms of education, which 
could be a far different set.  While meritocratic standards might have some intrinsic 
ethical justification, I am unaware of any argument that they are sufficient to dominate 
other factors in determining college admissions.   23 
laudable, I doubt that additional efforts in this direction will have much effect on levels of 
black/white inequality.  Rather, the challenge is to raise the qualifications of 
disadvantaged groups so that under “meritocratic” decisionmaking, their representation 
reflects their size in the population.  What does this mean operationally? Consider the 
case of college enrollments.  Suppose one could identify the reasons why test scores 
among disadvantaged groups lag behind others. Further, suppose that one provided 
compensatory classes, etc. that are targeted to improve educational attainments in the 
specific areas associated with the low scores; assume these classes are specifically 
created at schools with high minority enrollments. This would be a form of supply-side 
affirmative action. 
Such policies have in fact been implemented in the US Army, as described by 
Moskos and Butler (1996).  In the face of large differential promotion rates between 
black and white soldiers, the Army’s response was not to alter promotion decisions in 
order to increase diversity. Rather, the Army carefully studied the sources of the 
differences and implemented programs to address them.  Specifically, differences in basic 
writing skills proved to be important and so compensatory education programs were 
developed to allow soldiers to improve these skills.  These programs have been 
efficacious, yet do not appear to have produced any of the resentments associated with 
conventional affirmative action programs. As Moskos and Butler (1996) observe, 
“Although affirmative action does have its tensions, it is not a prescription 
for…resentment by whites” (pg. 70). 
Supply-side affirmative action or other policies are hardly a panacea.  If nothing 
else, sufficiently little is known about the sources of educational differences between 
black and white youths to assert that one can identify programs that are certain to reduce 
these differences.  Further, one suspects that whatever programs appear most efficacious 
will also be extremely expensive.  Nevertheless, this approach to associational 
redistribution may be the most politically promising avenue available as it can, at least in 
principle, retain meritocracy as a standard for group memberships while allowing for 





A second important implication of memberships models concerns the form of the 
effects of alterative public policies, whether they redistribute memberships or income. 
Memberships models strongly suggest that policy effects may be highly nonlinear. What 
this means is that one cannot evaluate a large policy intervention by a proportional 
scaling up of the effects found from a small policy intervention.  This nonlinearity can cut 
in more than one direction.  As argued above, it is possible that a large scale expansion of 
the MTO demonstration could be far less efficacious than the small scale program has 
been.  On the other hand, it is possible for large scale interventions to be far more 
efficacious than small scale ones.  One reason is that a large scale intervention may alter 
the number of equilibria in a group.  To return to an earlier example, a large enough 
change in the private incentives to graduate from high school will always eliminate 
socially inferior equilibria (i.e. multiple equilibria cannot exist when private incentives 
are strong enough, holding social incentives fixed). As discussed earlier, a key feature of   24 
formal memberships models is the complex interplay of private and social incentives to 
produce aggregate outcomes.  This complexity makes it difficult to forecast the effects of 
policies. 
Nonlinearity is also important in the evaluation of empirical studies.  The bulk of 
statistical analyses of membership effects use linear models, which from the perspective 
of memberships models are often misspecified. This may help explain some of the 
weakness of the statistical evidence of group influences. 
 
Relations between policy analysis and data analysis 
 
A final argument I wish to make concerns the way in which evidence on 
memberships models of poverty traps should be used to inform policy discussions.  
The conventional approach to the empirical evaluation of group effects in 
economics and other disciplines is via hypothesis testing.  The presence of group effects 
is evaluated by the statistical significance of some coefficient or set of coefficients given 
some pre-assigned significance level, e.g. 5%.  Such evaluations, it is well known from 
arguments in the statistics literature, do not have any deep justification.  For my purposes, 
the key issue is that statistical significance is at best indirectly related to the question of 
how data should inform policy evaluation.   
To see this, consider the following thought experiment.
25  A policymaker must 
assess the effect of a change in private incentives, say a specific college scholarship 
program, on the high school test scores in a given school.  The policymaker has available 
a linear regression which relates the test score to various factors including the costs of 
college as well as some function of the test scores of the individual’s peers. Assume that 
a single parameter measures whether this function of the test scores of others affects an 
individual and that there exist multiple self consistent test scores in a school when this 
coefficient is greater than 1. Suppose the coefficient is not statistically significant at the 
5% level. Should the policymaker therefore assume away the possibility of peer group 
effects and the possibility of a test score “trap” given this lack of statistical significance 
when making the policy evaluation?  
The answer to this question is “not necessarily.” The problem with the use of the 
5% level to assess the peer effect is simple:  it does not correspond to any decision 
problem on the part of the policymaker. From the perspective of decision theory, a 
policymaker should assess a program by computing a distribution of costs and benefits 
and, based on his particular payoff or utility function; formally speaking, the policymaker 
should recommend the policy if the net expected payoff of the policy is positive.  But 
such a calculation will depend critically on the payoff function of the policymaker and on 
the full distribution of the regression coefficients that characterize the uncertainty in the 
policy’s effects.  Now, suppose that the policymaker puts very high value on avoiding 
very low test scores, because they preclude students from pursuing higher education.  
Then it would be entirely possible that despite the lack of statistical significance to the 
peer effects, the fact that the available data place some positive probability on a 
coefficient greater than 1, so a poverty trap exists, might be sufficient to lead to a 
                                                 
25See Brock and Durlauf (2001c) for a formal development of the conceptual framework 
employed here.   25 
recommendation for the policy.  The key intuition, I believe, is that the possibility of 
poverty traps are something a policymaker will very much wish to guard against, which 
will implicitly alter the way data are evaluated relative to the conventional practice of 
ignoring effects where statistical significance has not been established.
26 
This argument, however, should not be exploited to assert that there is some 
fundamental support for policy interventions in the presence of possible poverty traps.  
Further, the argument itself is open to abuse in the sense that one can always find a set of 
prior beliefs over the presence of poverty traps that for a given data set will support 
redistributive interventions. Nevertheless, my intuition (and one that is motivating some 
of my current research) is that poverty traps will, relative to conventional empirical 





Poverty traps are high on the set of pernicious phenomena any just society will 
wish to guard against.  Yet one message of the renaissance of research on income 
inequality over the last 15 years is that relatively little is still understood about whether 
such poverty traps exist and if so, what produces them.  The memberships theory of 
inequality provides a set of models in which poverty traps may occur.  These models are 
appealing as metaphors for poverty traps for several reasons.  Because of their emphasis 
on the ways in which poor neighborhoods create social and psychological damage to their 
residences, the models capture much of the understanding of persistent poverty derived 
from the ethnographic literature.  From the perspective of social science theory, these 
models clarify how social determinants of behavior can lead to individually rational but 
collectively undesirable outcomes.  Such socially undesirable equilibria produce a 
rationale for possible policy interventions. 
Yet I cannot help feel that despite the intellectual promise of this approach, we 
currently understand far too little about the individual level determinants of behavior to 
have much confidence in particular policy recommendations.  The empirical literature on 
group membership effects is, on its own terms, fairly indecisive.  Further, it has provided 
little guidance on the particular causal mechanisms by which groups influence their 
members.  Further, one necessarily worries about the general equilibrium effects of 
policies designed to alter group memberships.  Certainly the failure of public policy to 
stop powerful tendencies towards racial segregation (Massey and Denton (1993)) gives 
one pause.  So, while I remain convinced that memberships models do have much to say 
about the sources of persistent poverty and that forms of associational redistribution 
should be part of policy debates, I also believe we need better ways to evaluate policies in 
the presence of immense uncertainty both about the determinants of the problem to be 
                                                 
26In some respects, I am advocating a move away from frequentist approaches to data 
analysis towards a Bayesian perspective. This is true in the sense that I believe a more 
appropriate object for statistical exercises is the computation of posterior densities for 
coefficients of interest rather than the conduct of hypothesis tests per se. On the other 
hand, I see little importance to many of the philosophical issues that divide frequentists 
and Bayesians for policy analysis.   26 
addressed as well as the efficacy of the instruments available to affect change.  At one 
level, this is nothing more than a call for a formal decision-theoretical approach to policy 
evaluation, an approach whose analytical foundations date from Abraham Wald (cf. Wald 
(1950)).
27 This sort of formal approach has generally not been pursued in policy 
evaluation, but clearly must be if we are to make consistent progress towards a more 
egalitarian society. I believe that much of the reaction against the Great Society 
antipoverty initiatives of the 1960’s is due to their failure to meet public expectations of 
their effects.  If nothing else, the political viability of new programs will be enhanced by 
realistic assessments of the uncertainty that faces any sustained effort of this type. 
                                                 
27A more formal way to express the concerns described here is that there is substantial 
model uncertainty associated with theories of poverty, including membership theories.  
This uncertainty must be accounted for in order to do proper expected utility calculations 
for policy evaluation.  See Draper (1995) for a discussion of a number of conceptual 
issues and Brock and Durlauf (2001c) for a discussion of the implications of model 
uncertainty for economic policymaking.   27 
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